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has been suggested that "anti-ademption statutes" could be passed, as
we now have "anti-lapse statutes," to prevent the legacy's failing;1
but apparently no state has been willing to go so far to remedy the
situation. Even if it were found under the above remedies that the
legatee or devisee were entitled to the proceeds of the legacy, query
as to whether insurance proceeds would be considered proceeds of the
legacy or of a separate contract.
It would seem that the most practical remedy is to be found in the
will itself. Thus, if the testator were to provide in his will that if the
specific legacy is not a part of his estate at his death, the legatee is to
take other rights, such as the proceeds of the property, the property
purchased with the proceeds of the property, or the insurance derived
from its damage or destruction in lieu of the property specifically bequeathed, the problem would be practically extinct except for the matter
of tracing proceeds. The intent of the testator can best be served when
drafting his will by informing him of the possibility of ademption and
the remedies available.
ELTON C. PRIDGEN
Witnesses-Competency of Husband and Wife-Effect of Validity
and Purpose of Marriage
Defendant was on trial for violation of the immigration laws. He
had entered into a marriage in France with an honorably discharged
veteran for the purpose of bringing himself within the language of the
War Brides Act1 so as to gain entrance to the United States. At the
time of the marriage both parties understood its limited purpose; it was
agreed that a divorce would be obtained after the marriage had served
this purpose; and the wife received a sum of money for participating
in the plan. At the trial the government offered the wife as a witness
against the defendant. He objected on the ground that she was his wife
pursuant to a French marriage and therefore incompetent to testify
against him. Held: The validity or invalidity of the French marriage
is immaterial. The relationship was entered into with no intention of
the parties to live together as husband and wife, but only for the purpose of using the ceremony in a scheme to defraud. The marriage was
a sham, empty, phony affair, and the ostensible spouse was competent
to testify against the defendant. 2
"0Mecham, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 514 (1948):
1TI AmERIcAN LAW oF PROPERTY § 14.13 (1952).
'See 59 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U. S. C § 232 (1947) which provides in effect
that alien spouses of United States citizens serving in, or having an honorable
discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United States during the
Second
World War, shall be admitted to the United States.
2
Lutwak v. U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481 (1953).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

The federal courts have generally3 followed the rule that spouses are
incompetent as witnesses against each other in criminal actions unless
the defendant is being tried for violence upon the person of the offered
witness spouse.4 The principal decision recognized this rule to be the
existing law, but refused to apply it because the marriage was a sham.
The language of the decision-so-called narriage,ostensible spouse, and
sham nmarriage 5-indicates that the refusal to declare the witness incompetent was based on the conclusion that the marriage was in fact
invalid; however, in reaching this conclusion the Court refused to consider the appropriate law governingthe marriage by stating that the
legal marital status of the parties was immaterial.
In jurisdictions which adhere to the rule that spouses are incompetent as witnesses against each other in criminal actions, incompetency
is treated as an incident of a valid marriage. 6 The question of whether
an offered witness is the wife of an accused so as to be incompetent is
determined by the trial judge.7 However, the controlling factor in his
determination of competency is the marital status of the parties at the
time of the trial.8 If the marriage, when tested by the applicable law
'See 28 U. S. C. § 664 (1947) which provides in effect that in any prosecu-

tion for bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful cohabitation, under any statute of the
United States, the lawful husband or wife of the accused shall be a competent
witness.
" U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Shore v. U. S., 174 F. 2d 838

(8th Cir. 1949); Hays v. U. S., 168 F. 2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Brunner v.

U. S., 168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948) ; U. S. v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1943); Paul v. U. S., 79 F. 2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935). But cf. Yoder v. U. S., 80
F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
Lutwak v.U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481, 488 (1953).
'Miles v. U. S., 103 U. S. 304 (1880); U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1949) ; Matz v. U. S., 158 F. 2d 190 (D. C. 1946) ; Elmore v. State, 140 Ala.
199, 37 So. 156 (1904) ; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942) ; People
v. Thornton, 235 P. 2d 227 (Cal. App. 1951) ; People v. McIntire, 213 Cal. 50, 1
P. 2d 443 (1931) ; State v. Chrismore, 223 Iowa 957, 247 N. W. 3 (1937) ; Wilson
v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37 So. 2d 19 (1948) ; Rowland v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. Rep.
164, 129 P. 2d 609 (1942) ; Scott v. State, 59 Okla. Cr. Rep. 231, 57 P. 2d 639
(1936); Commonwealth v. Carey, 105 Penn. Super. Ct. Rep. 362, 161 A. 410
(1932) ; Norvell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr. Rep. 213, 193 S. W. 2d 200 (1946).
"When an accused objects to the competency of an offered witness on the
grounds that she is his spouse and the prosecution challenges the validity of the

marriage, the judge holds a special preliminary examination to determine the
issue. Dickerson v. State, 30 Ga. App. 352, 118 S. E. 67 (1923) ; State v. Chrismore, 223 Iowa 957, 274 N. W. 3 (1947); Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37
So. 2d 19 (1948) ; Commonwealth v. Carey, 105 Penn. Super. Ct. Rep. 362, 161
A. 410 (1932); State v. McGinty. 14 Wash. 2d 71. 126 P. 2d 1086 (1942);
State v. Frye, 45 Wash. 645, 80 Pac. 170 (1907). See also, U. S. v. Walker,
176 F. 2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949) ; See Shores v. U. S., 174 F. 2d 838 (8th Cir.
1949) (followed procedure); Brunner v. U. S., 168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948)
(followed procedure).
Contra: Goodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178, 132 S. E. 899
(1926) (issue left to jury). When the validity of the marriage is also an issue
which is material in the case being tried, the judge still
rules on the issue for
the purpose of competency; however, his ruling can come only after enough evidence on the issue has been presented during the course of the trial to convince
him of the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Miles v. U. S., 103 U. S. 304
(1880); Matz v. U. S.. 158 F. 2d 190 (D. C. 1946).
'Elmore v. State, 140 Ala. 199. 37 So. 156 (1904) ; State v. Chrismore "223
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governing the relationship,9 is valid, the witness thenceforth becomes
the lawful wife of the defendant, and thus is incompetent. 10
The general rule is that marriages will, if valid by the laws of the
place where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction. 1' Once the validity of the marriage is determined according to
12
the law at the lex loci contractus,its incidents are automatic elsewhere
unless recognition of the marriage would contravene some public policy
of the forum.

13

Hence, in the instant case, the Court's disregard of French marriage
law and local public policy controlling recognition of the marriage seems
to have been inconsistent with its recognition of the rule that spouses
are incompetent to testify against each other.14 The Court could have
used the power conferred upon if by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 15 to effectuate the suggestion ,made by several preceding
decisions 16 that the rule disqualifying spouses as witnesses against each
other in criminal action be abrogated. However, once the Court chose
not to take this step, it is difficult to comprehend how it could recognize
the rule and at the same time completely ignore the marital statusthe controlling factor in determining whether the rule should be ap17
plied.
As a practical matter, the same result probably could have been
reached by the Court if the marital status had been considered. A
persuasive indication that the so-called sham marriage here did not
Iowa 957, 274 N. W. 3 (1937); Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111, 37 So. 2d 19
(1948) ; Scott v. State, 59 Okla. Cr. Rep. 231, 57 P. 2d 639 (1936) ; Norvell v.
State, 149 Tex. Cr. Rep. 213, 193 S.W. 2d 200 (1946) ; State v. McGinty, 14
Wash. 2d 71, 126 P. 2d 1086 (1942). See also, U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564.
568 (2d Cir. 1949).
9State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P. 2d 882 (1942).
10 See note 6 supra.
11
Loughram v. Loughram, 292 U. S. 216 (1934) ; Baron v. U. S., 191 F. 2d
837 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Frozen v. Du Pont, 146 F. 2d 837 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Toshcko
Inaba v. Noyle, 36 F. 2d 481 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. 2d 927
(E. D. La. 1925) ; Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713 (D. Ct. D Mass. 1924) ; Great
Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918) ; In re Miller's Estate, 239
Mich.
455, 214 N. W. 428 (1927).
2
Loughram v. Loughram, 292 U. S. 216 (1934) (dower award); Frozen v.
Du Pont, 146 F. 2d 837 (3d Cir. 1944) (workmen's compensation award)
Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. 2d 927 (E. D. La. 1925) (immigration privilege);
Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713 (D. Ct. D Mass. 1924) (immigration privilege);
Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918) (death claim of
surviving spouse).
2 Ex parte Soucek, 101 F. 2d 405 (7th Cir. 1939) ; Osoinach v. Watkins, 235
Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938); Takahashi's Estate v. Jorgensen, 113 Mont. 490,
129 P. 2d 217 (1942) ; Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 725 (1940).
14 See note 6 supra.
1" See FFD. R. CRIM. P. 26 which provides as follows: " . . The admissibility
of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed,
except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience." (Italics added.)
"See Funk v. U. S., 290 U. S. 371 (1934) ; U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564
(2d Cir. 1949) ; Yoder v. U. S., 80 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
17 See note 8 supra.
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contravene any public policy in American jurisdictions is the fact that
such marriages have been held valid in many of the states.' 8 However,
under French law, where the marriage ceremony was performed, when
parties go through a ceremony of marriage for some purpose other than
that of creating a true relationship of husband and wife, the marriage
is treated as void. 19
Aside from the means used by the Court in the instant case, there
is no particular quarrel with the ultimate result of the 'decision. The
reason usually given for the disqualification of spouses as witnesses
20
against each other is to protect the sanctity of the marital relationship.
When two people marry with no intention by either to enter the relationship for the purposes commonly understood, the reason for the
rule obviously disappears. The Court here attempted to alleviate such
a situation by basing competency on the purpose of the marriage rather
than on its validity. This approach would undoubtedly be desirable
in that it would prevent the application of the rule for the sake of the
rule21 rather than for the sake of the reason underlying the rule. However, as pointed out above, 22 such a departure would be inconsistent
with the rule itself since the rule applies to married persons as such.
To effectuate this approach, it would seem necessary to abandon the
rule of incompetency as to married persons and substitute therefor a
rule declaring a witness incompetent where it appears that the sanctity of
the witness's marital relationship would be affected by allowing her to
testify. The dissenting opinion in the principal case23 recognized the
necessity of. determining the invalidity of the marriage according to the
proper law governing the relationship in order to be consistent with the
rule of incompetency and summed the situation up as follows: "Whenever a court has a case where behavior that obviously is sordid can be
proved to be criminal only with great 'difficulty, the effort to bridge the
24
gap is apt to produce bad law."
ERVIN I. BAER
', See Schilbi v. Schilbi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A. 2d 831 (1949)
(legitimizing
child) ; De Vries v. De Vries, 195 Ill. App. 4 (1915) (nullification of employment

contract) ; Hansen v. Hansen, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N. E. 673 (1934) (retention of
position and salary increase); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (1942)
(protection of reputation) ; Erickson v. Erickson, 38 N. Y. S. 2-1 588 (1942)
(legitimizing child); Campbell v. Moore. 189 S. C. 497, 1 S. E. 2d 784 (1939)
(legitimizing child). For a compilation of cases involving limited purpose marriages see 14 A. L. R. 2d 624 (1950).
"01 RABEL, CoxrFcr OF LAWS 272 (Draper-Yntema, ed. 1945).
.0 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3d ed. 1940).
"1See U. S. v. Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949) (accused had married
witness solely for the purpose of defrauding her of money; the parties had
separated; and reconciliation seemed highly unlikely) ; Norvell v. State, 149 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 213, 193 S. W. 2d 200 (1946) (accused married witness for the exclusive
purpose of rendering her incompetent to testify against him).
22 See note 14 supra.
2' See Lutwak v. U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481, 490 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
24 Ibid.

